Competitor chats about price, quotas or market allocation are cartel fuel — ‘industry association guidance’ is not a shield.
Horizontal monopoly agreements among competitors — price-fixing, output limits, market division, bid-rigging — sit at the core of China’s AML enforcement. Trade associations can be facilitators. Leniency and commitment mechanisms exist but are strategic. This wiki is cartel-risk orientation. RPM is vertical. Dawn-raid/first-hour pages cover the knock at the door. Compliance programmes need competitor-contact rules.
4 questions before you choose the route.
This page identifies the right question and evidence. It does not determine the legal outcome on a reader’s facts.
Any competitor contact on price/markets?
Exposure.
ContactAssociation meetings minutes?
Facilitation.
AssocBid strategy discussions?
Rigging risk.
BidRaid protocol ready?
Investigation twins.
RaidWorking rule: Map the regulated role before marketing or launch in China.
The signal ledger.
These facts move the question beyond a label and into a product, money-flow and control analysis.
Bring a compact evidence docket—not a pitch deck.
Give a compliance team or counsel the operating facts that reveal the perimeter.
Questions people ask before they build.
Short answers for orientation. The right result can change with the service model and current rules.
Is information exchange always a cartel?
Sensitive future pricing exchanges can be. Counsel on boundaries.
Where is the raid playbook?
Open /china-antitrust-dawn-raid and /china-antitrust-investigation-first-hour.
Primary authorities
Reviewed sources support orientation, not a fact-specific assessment.